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ABSTRACT
The lightweight protocols and low-power radio technologies
open up many opportunities to facilitate Internet-of-Things
(IoT) into our daily life, while their minimalist design also
makes IoT devices vulnerable to many active attacks due
to the lack of sophisticated security protocols. Recent ad-
vances advocate the use of an antenna array to extract fine-
grained physical-layer signatures to mitigate these active
attacks. However, it adds burdens in terms of energy con-
sumption and hardware cost that IoT devices cannot afford.
To overcome this predicament, we present ShieldScatter, a
lightweight system that attaches battery-free backscatter
tags to single-antenna devices to shield the system from
active attacks. The key insight of ShieldScatter is to inten-
tionally create multi-path propagation signatures with the
careful deployment of backscatter tags. These signatures can
be used to construct a sensitive profile to identify the loca-
tion of the signals’ arrival, and thus detect the threat. We
prototype ShieldScatter with USRPs and ambient backscatter
tags to evaluate our system in various environments. The
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experimental results show that even when the attacker is
located only 15 cm away from the legitimate device, Shield-
Scatter with merely three backscatter tags can mitigate 97%
of spoofing attack attempts while at the same time trigger
false alarms on just 7% of legitimate traffic.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The continuous advancement in low power radios and light-
weight protocols is driving the proliferation of Internet-of-
Things (IoT) in our daily life. However, the other side of the
coin is that IoT devices easily bear the risks by active attacks
such as spoofing attack and Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack
during devices pairing or data transmission. For example,
considering the scenario shown in Figure 1, a legitimate
user (e.g., a smart TV) is pairing or sharing data with an
IoT access point (AP). An active attacker equipped with an
omnidirectional or directional antenna impersonates the le-
gitimate user and sends a fake command (e.g., DoS command
or fake data) to the AP.
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Figure 1: Illustration of active attack.
Traditional approachesmainly rely on the complex encryp-
tion algorithm, which will lead to computational resources
and energy waste [3, 5] and are not feasible for simply de-
signed IoT devices. Alternatively, fine-grained physical-layer
signatures, such as angle of arrival (AoA) [27], channel state
information CSI [7] and received signal strength (RSS) [1, 2]
have recently received much attention to mitigating these
threats. However, these systems require at least two or an
antenna array (e.g., an eight-antenna array) to construct sen-
sitive signatures, and thus are expensive and not applicable
for the systems where the APs and IoT devices are equipped
with only a small number of antennas. In addition, in an
open space (e.g., the hall), the multi-path phenomenon is
indistinctive, making it difficult to extract the fine-grained
AoA signatures.
This paper presents ShieldScatter, a lightweight system to
secure IoT device pairing and data transmission. Instead of
relying on the expensive antenna array, ShieldScatter advo-
cates the use of merely several ultra-low-cost and battery-
free backscatter tags [12] to secure the IoT device. Our key
insight is that backscatter tags communicating based on
backscattering ambient signals, can be exploited to intention-
ally create fine-grained multi-path signatures. In particular,
upon detecting any suspicious transmission, the legitimate
user is asked to transmit the challenge-response based sig-
nals to the AP within the coherence time. At the same time,
the AP controls the tags to backscatter the signals. We ob-
serve that even in dynamic channel environments, the prop-
agation signatures created by the backscatter tags can be
used to construct a unique profile to identify each user. This
unique propagation signature profile then confirms whether
these two signals are from the same devices and help defend
against active attacks.
To realize the above idea, we entail the following chal-
lenges.
(1) How to employ backscatter tags to create sensitive prop-
agation signatures without using an expensive antenna array
or other powerful hardware? Most home devices employ only
a small number of antennas for data transmission, which
makes it inapplicable for them to construct accurate propaga-
tion signatures, such as AoA. To overcome this predicament,
we consider leveraging the multi-path features of backscatter
tags to generate distinct propagation signatures. In partic-
ular, we attach the tags around the AP. When initializing
the system, the AP receives the signals. At the same time,
the AP controls the tags to reflect wireless signals in turn.
This intentional deployment can create artificial multi-path
propagations that are sensitive to senders’ locations. If these
two signals are from the same devices, the multi-path ef-
fects of the backscatter tags on these two signals will have
strong similarity in the coherence time. Thus, these distinct
propagation signatures can be used to identify the legitimate
users.
(2) How to construct reliable signatures when unstable fac-
tors exist? In home environments, walking people, environ-
mental noise and an imperfect circuit design of the tags will
lower the similarity of these two signals from the legitimate
users. In order to construct reliable signatures, ShieldScatter
extracts the representative features from the signals for the
first step. Then, ShieldScatter aligns and compares the sim-
ilarity of the features using dynamic time warping (DTW).
Furthermore, a one-class support vector machine (SVM) clas-
sifier is used to distinguish and defend against signals from
active attackers. If the signals are from the same devices,
it will lead to strong similarity and short DTW distances,
and then these signals will be clustered into the legitimate
class. Otherwise, it will lead to large DTW distances and
ShieldScatter can detect and defend against the attackers.
Summary of result. We prototype ShieldScatter with
USRPs and ambient backscatter tags to evaluate our system
in various environments. The experimental results show
that even when the attacker is located only 15 cm away
from the legitimate device, ShieldScatter with merely three
backscatter tags can mitigate 97% of spoofing attack attempts
while at the same time trigger false alarms on just 7% of
legitimate traffic.
Contributions. First, we propose ShieldScatter to use
the multi-path propagation signatures intentionally created
by backscatter tags to secure the IoT devices. Second, we
use multiple backscatter tags to create unique multi-path
signatures, which avoids the employment of an expensive
antenna array to obtain fine-grained signatures and can work
in the absence of multipath. Finally, our results show that
our system is robust even when active attacker is close to
the legitimate user.
2 MOTIVATION
In this section, we first discuss the potential threats to the IoT
devices and argue that a lightweight mechanism designed
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Figure 2: The active attacker sends DoS command or
fake data to the AP when the IoT device is pairing or
exchanging data with the AP.
for securing these devices is critical. Next, we investigate the
fine-grained signatures of physical-layer radio propagations
used to defend against active attacks, which motivates our
design of using backscatter tags to secure IoT devices.
2.1 Threat Model
Recently, the link establishment and data sharing between
smart home IoT devices have become more and more in-
dispensable. However, they are easily attacked by the ac-
tive attackers. For example, as shown in Figure 2, the legit-
imate user is pairing with an AP based on the challenge-
response protocols. When initializing pairing, the legitimate
user who intends to share information with an AP sends
a message (Message 1) for request. If the AP receives this
message, it sends an acknowledgement message (Message
2) back. Finally, the legitimate user receives Message 2 and
feeds back the message (Message 3). However, during this
process, a powerful attacker who has all the priori knowl-
edge of the protocol and the legitimate user (e.g., the coding
scheme, carrier frequency and signal strength) can use an
omnidirectional antennas to detect the initialization of the
communication. Then, it enables a directional antenna to
inject fake data (e.g., the DoS command or spoofing data) to
attack the AP, and thus the AP receives the command from
the attacker, which leads to the rejection or unauthorized
access to the AP.
ShieldScatter considers that the attacker will not be trig-
gered to attack the IoT devices all the time. In other words,
only if the attacker detects a legitimate user trying to connect
or share the data with the AP (e.g., detectingMessage 1), then
the attacker will initialize the attack. Besides, ShieldScatter
only defends against active attacks and makes no exploration
of protecting against passive attacks such as eavesdropping
attacks and information leakage.
2.2 Propagation Signatures
Existing approaches to secure these active attacks by relying
on extracting fine-grained propagation signatures from the
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Figure 3: If the signals are from the same devices, the
AoA signatures have high similarity between them.
Otherwise, the AoA signatures will be different.When
we use three tags to create multipath, the average en-
ergy of each tags has the similar performance as AoA
signatures.
physical-layer information. In particular, as shown in Fig-
ure 3(a), SecureArray [27] extracts the AoA signatures from
the received signal with an antennas array. If the received
signals are from the same location within the coherence time,
the radio propagation will experience the same multipath,
which accordingly leads to strong similarity for the AoA
signatures (e.g., the red and blue dashed). Then, based on
the similarity of the AoA signatures, active attacks can be
detected.
However, in smart homes, the devices may lack multiple
antennas, and thus the methods of extracting fine-grained
signatures with an antenna array will be inapplicable. In-
spired by SecureArray that uses multi-path signatures to
secure the devices, we observe that low-cost and battery-free
backscatter tags can also generate such multi-path propaga-
tion signatures without using an expensive antenna array.
According to [12], as shown in Figure 1, backscatter is a
new communication primitive where a tag transmits data
by intermittently reflecting ambient signals. Accordingly,
the multipath created by the tags can be used to construct a
sensitive profile to protect the IoT devices.
In order to verify this idea, we employ three tags to attach
around the AP at a distance of a half-wavelength and use
two USRPs to emulate legitimate user and active attackers,
respectively. Then, the AP controls the tags to reflect the
signals in turn. Finally, we extract backscatter signals using
the sliding windows and compare the average energy of
each tag. The result is shown in Figure 3(b). We observe if
the signals are from the same device, the average energy
of the tags will have high similarity (e.g., the red and blue
dashed). Whereas, if the signals are from different devices,
even though the attacker is in the same direction from the
AP, the distances from the tags to the user are not the same
as the distances from the tags to the attacker, and thus it will
lead to significant differences with respect to the amplitudes
of the tags (e.g., the green dashed). This result presents a
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Figure 4: System overview.
similar performance to AoA signatures and it motivates us to
design ShieldScatter, a lightweight system to secure the IoT
devices by using backscatter tags. ShieldScatter intentionally
createsmulti-path signatures by controlling the tags to reflect
the ambient signals in turn. Besides, in order to construct a
reliable profile to detect the threat, ShieldScatter also fetches
other representative features and combines with a one-class
SVM based classifier to identify the attackers.
Besides, we should notice that the signal transmission
should be completed within the coherence time. This is be-
cause the wireless channel is easily affected by the environ-
mental states. However, when in coherence time, the channel
can be treated as stable even in dynamic environments. The
coherence time can be defined as, T = 9λ16×π×v , where λ rep-
resents the carrier wavelength andv indicates the maximum
velocity of legitimate user [20, 27].
3 SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section, we first present an overview of ShieldScatter
which consists of four key steps. Then, we elaborate on
each step and provide the technical details in the following
subsections.
3.1 System Overview
The basic idea of ShieldScatter is to construct sensitive multi-
path propagation signatures using several backscatter tags
attached around the AP instead of an expensive antenna ar-
ray. In particular, as shown in Figure 2, when the legitimate
user is pairing with the AP, it is easily attacked by the fake
transmission (e.g., by launching a deauthentication message).
To defend against this attack, upon detecting the suspicious
transmission, the AP is asked to control the tags to work in
turn during this processing. Then, by comparing the signa-
tures from the same device (e,g., Message 1 and Message 3)
or from different devices (e,g., Message 3 and the suspicious
command), ShieldScatter carries out the security system to
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Figure 5: ShieldScatter detects and segments backscat-
ter component by combining backscatter decoding
and energy envelope detection.
verify whether the suspicious messages are from the legiti-
mate device and then defend against active attacks, which
will be elaborated in Section 3.6.
To detect the attacks, as illustrated in Figure 4, at a high
level ShieldScatter needs to go through the following four
steps. First, based on the collected data at the AP, Shield-
Scatter detects and segments the signals that includes the
backscatter signal. Second, ShieldScatter extracts representa-
tive features from the segments. Third, to construct a reliable
propagation profile, ShieldScatter compares the features by
computing the distances with DTW. Finally, based on the
profiles with respect to the DTW distances, ShieldScatter
can identify and defend against the attacks with a one-class
SVM classifier.
3.2 Backscatter Detection and
Segmentation
Recall that ShieldScatter constructs sensitivemulti-path prop-
agation signatures by controlling the backscatter tags to
work in turn. However, because of the latency of the tag
initialization, the received signals always contain the com-
ponent without backscatter, which makes the multi-path
signatures not distinct in this component. Thus, to ensure to
extract reliable feature from the received signals, ShieldScat-
ter needs to detect and segments the received signals for the
first step.
In our system, in order to segment the signals, we first
decode the received signals using a moving average method
as [12] where we use a sliding window with a length of 50
samples to smooth the signal. After smoothing, ShieldScat-
ter decodes the message of backscatter signals as shown in
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Figure 6: Features extracted from the same device.
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Figure 7: Features extracted from the different devices.
Figure 5(a). In order to determine the segment, ShieldScatter
follows the principle: if the AP can continuously decode the
backscatter signals, then the corresponding original signals
samples from the starting point to the ending point are con-
sidered as the segment that contains the backscatter signal.
Accordingly, we mark the starting point and the ending point
as η1 and η2, respectively.
After that, ShieldScatter can achieve a raw signal segmen-
tation to detect the backscatter. However, because of the
imperfect circuit design and noise, it is not accurate enough
to segment the signals. Thus, to improve the accuracy of
the signal segmentation, we employ an energy envelope
detecting method for assistance. Specifically, a sliding win-
dow upon the received signal amplitude is used to detect
the backscatter, where we calculate the average energy E(i)
within this sliding window by
E(i) = 1
N
i+N∑
i=1
|x(i)|2, (1)
where N is the length of the sliding window, and x(i) is the
amplitude of the sample at sample index i . After calculating
the energy of the signals, we can easily yield the energy
envelope as shown in Figure 5(b). It is obvious that the en-
ergy envelope changes greatly when the backscatter tags are
working. Besides, we also find that the backscatter signal
always locates at the center of samples without backscatter,
which inspires us that the energy envelope will experience a
large variance when backscatter is working. Thus, in order
to determine the starting point to ending point of the seg-
ment that contains the backscatter signal, we calculate the
variance of the energy envelope by
V (j) = Var [E(j) : E(j + N )], (2)
where Var [E(j) : E(j + N )] represents we calculate the vari-
ance in every N samples and V (j) represents the variance
at index j. Then, we determine the starting point and end-
ing point of signals containing backscatter following the
constraint
0 < j < η3,V (j) < t ,V (η3 + 1) > t ,
η4 < j < m,V (j) > t ,V (η4 + 1) < t (3)
wherem represent the total number of V (j), η3 and η4 repre-
sents the starting point and the ending point of the segment,
respectively. t is the dynamic threshold. According to our
experimental study, we set the threshold as e2 where e is the
minimum energy of all the tags and it can be obtained by
the backscatter decoding.
Finally, we combine the method of backscatter decoding
and energy envelope detecting to determine the segment by
ηs = (η1 + η3)/ 2,
ηe = (η2 + η4)/ 2, (4)
where ηs and ηe represent the final decision for the starting
point and the ending point of the segment, respectively.
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3.3 Feature Extraction
Before constructing reliable multi-path propagation profiles,
ShieldScatter should fetch representative features from the
segments. According to the ambient backscatter theories [12],
the backscatter signal is an additional multipath generated by
the tag. This additional multipath can either constructively
or destructively interfere with the ambient signal. All of these
multipath mainly affect the amplitude of the ambient signal.
Thus, to construct reliable signatures, from the obtained
segments, ShieldScatter selects the features with respect to
the signal amplitude.
Intuitively, ShieldScatter can directly use the received raw
data (we call it as original signals in this paper) for com-
parison. However, the existing ambient noise will lower the
similarity of the comparison, and thus only the original sig-
nal is not enough to construct a reliable propagation profile.
Thus, in our system, besides original signal, five other signifi-
cant features with respect to the signal amplitude, including
smoothing signal, energy envelope, variance of the signals,
maximum and minimum, are also extracted to construct our
unique and sensitive multi-path propagation signatures to
profile each legitimate user. Specifically, in order to acquire
smoothing signal, ShieldScatter filters the original signals by
using a sliding window. As for energy envelope, variance,
maximum and minimum, ShieldScatter extracts these fea-
tures by computing the average energy envelope, variance,
maximum, and the minimum in every 50 data samples of the
original signals. Accordingly, ShieldScatter can obtain six
feature series for each of the segments obtained in Section 3.2.
As shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7, the feature series are ex-
tracted from the signals of the same and different devices
within the coherence time, respectively. It is obvious that
the features are similar when the signals are from the same
devices. Otherwise, if the signals are from different devices,
the features extracted from these two signals are quite differ-
ent. Accordingly, these representative features can be used
to construct reliable profile and secure the legitimate user.
3.4 DTW Distance Searching
After acquiring the feature series from the segments, Shield-
Scatter needs to compare the features to detect active at-
tackers. Thus, a reliable method to evaluate the similarity
of the extracted features of the corresponding segments is
needed. Intuitively, a simplest method is to calculate the cor-
relation of every two corresponding feature series directly.
However, because of the noise and imperfect circuit design
of the backscatter tags, even though the methods combining
the decoded and energy envelope have been exploited to
detect and segment the signal, they still cannot guarantee
an absolutely accurate partition of the received signal. Be-
sides, since the transmitting signals are sinusoidal waves and
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Figure 8: ShieldScatter searches the shortest distance
to compare the similarity between the extracted fea-
tures with DTW.
our tags reflect the signal in a periodic way, the imperfect
segmentation of the signals leads to the shifting of the fea-
tures, which can be seen in Figure 6. Thus, simply computing
the correlation to compare the feature series will lower the
similarity and are not applicable to our system. Instead, a
method that can mitigate the unfavorable effects caused by
misalignment is more desirable for comparison in our design.
Inspired by PinIt [24] and the method for the word matching
in speech recognition, they have similar nature of signatures
shifting. In order to mitigate the effect of misalignment, a
most commonly used method DTW can be adopted to over-
come this predicament. Thus, we compare the similarity of
the features to construct the propagation profiles by using
DTW distance computing [18] as follows: supposed given
the two feature series X (i) and Y (j) of the corresponding
segments (e.g., the feature maximum of Message 3 and the
suspicious message in Figure 2), the goal of DTW is to find
the minimum cost of the mapping sum from the feature se-
ries X (i) to Y (j). In particular, the cost of DTW from each
sample of X (i) to the arbitrary sample in Y (j) is defined by
using the Euclidean distance
w(i, j) = |X (i) − Y (j)|. (5)
Then, based on the Euclidean distance between each two
samples of these two feature series, a dynamic program-
ming algorithm is used for DTW to search for the warp path
distance. To understand the shortest path searching in Shield-
Scatter, we define the two feature series X (i) and Y (j) of the
features
X (i) = X (1),X (2), ...X (i)...X (m), (6)
Y (i) = Y (1),Y (2), ...Y (i)...Y (n), (7)
wherem and n represent the length of the these two series,
respectively. Then, based on these two series, we construct a
ShieldScatter: Improving IoT Security with Backscatter Assistance SenSys ’18, November 4–7, 2018, Shenzhen, China
Original space Feature space
Legitimate user
Active attacker
Support vector
Space mapping
 ϕ (·)
Hyperplane
Boundary
Figure 9: The profiles of the legitimate user can be
mapped into a feature space and separated from the
attacking samples.
network matrixW as shown in Figure 8, where each matrix
(i, j) inW indicates the Euclidean distancew(i, j) correspond-
ing to X (i) and Y (j). In order to search the best way to align
X (i) and Y (j), DTW first starts from the pointw(1, 1). Then,
DTW searches the shortest way following these rules: (1)
the next step in any matrix should be riдht , up or riдht and
up, which guarantees the monotonicity of the constraint for
DTW; (2) the total cost of the distances should be the lowest.
We define DTW in mathematical expressions as
min
W
m∑
i=1
n∑
i=1
w(i, j) (8)
s.t. sp = w(1, 1), ep = w(m,n),
st(i) ≤ st(i + 1), st(j) ≤ st(j + 1). (9)
whereW represents the route matrix, sp and ep the starting-
point and ending-point, respectively. st(i) indicates the hori-
zontal axis coordinates at the ith step, and the two constraint
conditions have guaranteed the boundary and monotonicity
for the route selection in DTW.
In our system, in order to reduce computational complex-
ity, we compute the DTW distances by dividing the fea-
ture series into different chunks instead of directly comput-
ing using the entire original signal and smoothing signal,
ShieldScatter segments the feature series equally into 128
chunks. Then, ShieldScatter computes the DTW distance in
each corresponding chunk. As for energy envelope, variance,
maximum and minimum, ShieldScatter divides them into
58 chunks and computes the DTW distances, respectively.
Accordingly, we can finally obtain a propagation profile with
respect to the DTW distance, which is a vector with the size
of 488. Compared with the method of calculating correlation
directly, DTW mitigates the effects caused by misalignment.
3.5 One-Class SVM Classification
Based on the similarity comparison of the extracted features,
we obtain a propagation profile vector with the size of 488
for every processing. As mentioned, the signals from same
devices will experience the same multipath caused by the
intentional deployment tags, which will lead to high simi-
larity and short DTW distance for the features. Otherwise,
the DTW distances will be significant difference. Thus, we
can transfer our problem of detecting the suspicious signals
into the problem of distinguishing the propagation profile
vectors so as to defend against the attacking signals.
At an intuitional level, in order to distinguish the propa-
gation profile vectors, a most likely method is to set fixed
thresholds for each value in the vector. Then, if all the values
are lower than the corresponding thresholds, the signals can
be considered as positive samples. However, this method is
unreliable, since the received signals will be significantly
affected by the environment noise in dynamic environments,
which make it difficult to determine these fixed thresholds.
To distinguish the legitimate user and attacker profiles,
ShieldScatter formulates our problem as a one-class classifi-
cation model. In particular, as illustrated in Figure 9, given a
large number of training profiles as [x1, x2, ...xi...xl], where
l ∈ N is the number of profiles, and xi the profile vector of
the profile i . The size of each propagation profile vector with
respect to the DTW distances is 488. As shown in Figure 9, in
the original space [19], if the profiles are positive and have
short DTW distances, the profiles of these legitimate users
will be similar and they will gather together closely. How-
ever, the samples that are from the attacker will be away
from these positive profiles except for a few outliers that
have short DTW distances. Thus, the goal of ShieldScatter is
to find an optimal boundary to capture most of the positive
samples and able to exclude the negative samples.
In order to define the optimal boundary, the strategy of
one-class support vector machine (SVM) is to map the sample
from the original space into a feature space using function
ϕ(x). As shown in Figure 9, in the feature space, the samples
can be separated by a hyperplane with method of maximum
margin, where this hyperplane is defined by some samples
called support vectors in the training set. In order to seek
out these support vectors, this problem can be formulated as
min
α
1
2
∑
i j
αiα jk(xi, xj), (10)
s.t. 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1
vl
,∑
i
αi = 1 (11)
where v ∈ (0,1] is an upper bound on the fraction of the
outliers and a lower bound on the fraction of support vectors.
k(.) represents the Gaussian kernel, which is defined as
k(xi, xj) = ϕ(xi) × ϕ(xj), (12)
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Figure 10: ShieldScatter integrates with existing secu-
rity protocols in the upper layers to enable device au-
thentication and defend against active attacks.
k(xi, xj) = exp(−
||xi − xj | |2
2σ 2
). (13)
Then, the decision function of ShieldScatter is defined as
f (x) = sgn(
∑
i
αik(xi, x) − ρ), (14)
where x is the sample of the testing profiles, xi the ith sup-
port vector and ρ the function bias. Hence, the based on
the hyperplane decided by the obtained support vectors, the
testing profiles can be classified into either legitimate users
or attackers.
3.6 Security Analysis
We finally integrates ShieldScatter with existing security pro-
tocols in the upper layers to enable device authentication and
defend against active attacks. Sitting between upper-layer
security protocols and PHY signal processing, ShieldScatter
conforms to reasoning analogous to existing security proto-
cols but differs in that ShieldScatter takes into account the
propagation signatures to secure IoT authentication.
Deauthentication deadlockmitigation. There are var-
ious ways to launch DoS attacks. A typical type of DoS at-
tacks takes the vulnerability before a secure link has been
established. As shown in Figure 10(a), we consider that an
authentication handshake is in progress. During the authen-
tication handshakes, to deauthenticate the establishment, an
attacker can inject an unauthorized deauthentication notifi-
cation after receiving an acknowledgement (ACK) from the
AP, which accordingly leads to a protocol deadlock.
To defend against the deauthentication deadlock, Shield-
Scatter adds an additional propagation signature processing
at the AP with slight protocol changes. Specifically, Shield-
Scatter controls the message transmission of handshake
within the coherence time. Then, upon hearing the deauthen-
tication command, ShieldScatter can compare the similarity
between the deauthentication command and the following
Message with the operations mentioned in Section 3. If the
one-class SVM identifies that the deauthentication command
Active attacker
Backscatter 
tags
Legitimate user
AP
Backscatter 
tags
Backscatter 
tags
Figure 11: We employ two USRPs to act as the AP and
legitimate user at a distance of 2.5 m. At the same
time, several tags are deployed around theAP to create
multi-path signatures. Besides, another two-antennas
USRP is used to act as active attacker.
is from the attacker, the AP will drop this data frame in the
upper layer. Accordingly, ShieldScatter can easily defend
against attacks.
Jamming and replaymitigation.An attacker can launch
a jamming and replay attack by equipping multiple antennas.
A multi-antenna attacker can jam the association packets re-
ception with one directional antenna and records the packet
with another antenna. The attacker then replays the recorded
packets to the legitimate device.
As illustrated in Figure 10(b), we also take the handshake
processing and deauthentication deadlock into account. Dur-
ing this process, an attacker first injects an unauthenticated
deauthentication notification after receiving the ACK from
the AP. When detecting the following Message, the attacker
jams this reception at the AP with one directional antenna,
while at the same time records Message with another direc-
tional antenna. The attacker then replays the recorded Mes-
sage to the AP. Thus, both of deauthentication command and
Message are from the attacker and the multi-path signatures
will be the same. However, when the attacker jams the recep-
tion of Message, the multi-path signatures at each tag during
jamming are the superposition of the legitimate user and
attacker. This will lead to a large difference in the energy for
each tag. Thus, ShieldScatter can easily detect this difference
and defend against the attacks. Channel spoofing mitiga-
tion. Using wireless physical layer information for location
distinction has been explored for many years [11, 14, 16]. It
has been discovered that the characteristics of the wireless
channel will be uncorrelated every a half carrier wavelength
over distance [6]. However, the work in [4] has found new at-
tacks against these approaches by emulating the multi-path
signatures.
The advantage of Shieldscatter is that this method make
it difficult for the attackers to select the real multi-path sig-
natures created by the backscatter tags. Specifically, in our
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Figure 12: Floor plan of our evaluation environment.
A and B represent the places of legitimate user andAP,
respectively.
system, ShieldScatter can randomly control the order of tags,
as long as it guarantees that the order of the tags is the same
in every process. Even though the attacker has emulated all
the multi-path signatures, it still cannot decide which multi-
path signature is the true one in each time when attacking.
Thus, ShieldScatter is more reliable than the methods that
simply compare the channel correlation.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
As shown in Figure 11, the prototype of ShieldScatter is im-
plemented using multiple backscatter tags and three GNURa-
dio/USRP B210 nodes. The backscatter tags are implemented
according to [12]. We tailor the antenna design to allow tags
to work at 900 MHz which is a commonly used frequency
for IoT devices. All the tags are deployed around the AP
at a distance of 15 cm (i.e., half of the wavelength). In our
experiment, both tags transmit data with a bitrate of 10 kbps.
Besides, one USRP node equipped with two antennas acts as
an active attacker, who monitors RSS variations with one of
the antennas while transmitting fake data using the other an-
tenna. The other two USRP nodes are used as the legitimate
user and AP, respectively and each of them contains only
one antenna. In our experiment, we require the legitimate
user and AP to complete the challenge-response protocol in
100 ms so as to maintain the channel to be stable.
5 EVALUATION
In our experiment, we evaluate the performance of Shield-
Scatter in both static and dynamic environments as shown
in Figure 12. We employ two USPRs to emulate a legitimate
user and an AP which are deployed at a distance of 2.5 m.
Specifically, we place the user at different locations (e.g., the
blue blocks) and the AP at location B, respectively. Besides,
another USRP that contains two antennas is deployed at
different locations (e.g., the red dot in Figure 12) to act as
an active attacker. In static environment, we conduct our
experiment and collect the signals during the day and at
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Figure 13: The performance with respect to the vary-
ing parameter v.
night. Besides, we also evaluate the performance in common
home environments where we consider the legitimate user
and AP are in both line-of-sight (LoS) and none line-of-sight
(NLoS) scenarios. In order to construct a NLoS environment,
we deploy different kinds of obstacles between the legitimate
users and AP. As for dynamic environment, two people are
asked to walk around when we perform the experiments.
In our experiment, a total number of 1,700 propagation
signatures are collected within a month for ShieldScatter in
both static and dynamic environments. Then, ShieldScatter
extracts the features to construct the profiles for all of these
data samples. 577 of the propagation profiles are used to
train and construct our one-class SVM model and the rest of
the profiles are used to test the performance of ShieldScatter.
Metrics.We employ the following metrics to evaluate the
performance of our system.
• True positive rate. True positive (TP) rate is defined
to be the ratio of the number of propagation profiles in
which the samples from the legitimate user is correctly
detected to the total number of samples.
• False positive rate. False positive (FP) rate is the ratio
of the number of propagation profiles in which the
samples from the active attackers is falsely recognized
as being the legitimate user to the total number of
samples.
5.1 Parameter Determination
The first step in our experiment is to determine the parame-
terv for the one-class SVM model. As mentioned before,v is
a significant parameter to constrain the bound of outliers and
support vectors, and the range of v is v ∈ (0, 1]. In order to
determine the parameterv , we exploit 500 groups of positive
data samples and 77 groups of negative samples for input
to training the one-class model ranging from 0 to 1 for the
parameter v . As shown in Figure 13, it is obvious that the
accuracy of correctly detecting the legitimate user decreases
with the parameter v . However, the accuracy of detecting
the active attackers increases when the parameter v grows.
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Figure 14: The performance with respect to the vary-
ing distances between the attacker and legitimate user
in static environment.
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Figure 15: The performance when the channel is shel-
tered by different obstacles.
That is because when parameter v increases, the bound be-
tween the legitimate samples and attacker samples tightens.
Sequentially, the outliers (i.e., the attacker) are excluded from
the positive samples. However, the larger the parameter in-
creases, the smaller the boundary becomes. In that case, some
positive samples are recognized as the outliers and excluded
from the positive samples. Thus, in order to determine the
optimal v for the one-class SVM model, we make a tradeoff
between them. As shown in the Figure 13, we select the pa-
rameter v at intersection point between these two curves.
Accordingly, we can achieve the accuracy of 93.7% for legiti-
mate users and active attacker detection when the parameter
v is set as 0.16.
5.2 Static Environment
Based on the determination of parameter v , we evaluate
the performance of ShieldScatter in the static environment,
where we keep the legitimate user, the AP, and the attackers
static. Then, we evaluate ShieldScatter with respect to the
distance between the legitimate user and active attackers,
the effects in both LoS and NLoS scenarios, and the number
of backscatter tags attached around the AP.
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Figure 16: The performance with respect to the vary-
ing number of backscatter tags.
Distance between legitimate user and attackers.Usu-
ally, the attacker will be far away from the legitimate user.
However, if the attacker is small enough and has the ability
to get close to legitimate users, it will be a challenge for the
IoT devices. Thus, in order to defend against the attackers
that are close to the legitimate users, we first evaluate the
performance of our system combined with the different dis-
tance between the legitimate users and active attackers. In
particular, we evaluate the performance in different distances
and different directions between the legitimate users and AP
ranging from 10 cm to 2 m. After that, we collect the data to
construct the profiles as input to test our system.
As shown in Figure 14, it is obvious that when the attacker
is far away from the legitimate user, ShieldScatter can achieve
an average TP rate of 93.6% and FP rate of 3%. However, if
the legitimate user is close to the attacker, especially when
the distances are lower than 15 cm, the FP rate increases
dramatically. That is because if the attacker is close enough
to the legitimate user, the multi-paths of them caused by
the backscatter tags are extremely similar. However, in our
experiment, even when the distance is closer to 15 cm, we
can still achieve an average FP rate lower than 10%, which is
acceptable for the daily smart home loT devices.
Effects of LoS and NLoS scenarios. For smart home
devices, a common situation is that the direct path will be
sheltered in some cases. For example, different obstacles
will shield the path between the legitimate user and the AP,
which accordingly has significant impacts on the backscat-
ter signals. Thus, in order to overcome this predicament,
we next evaluate the performance of ShieldScatter in both
line-of-sight (LoS) and non-line-of-sight (NLoS) scenarios.
Specifically, in order to emulate situations of LoS and NLoS,
we exploit the different kinds of common obstacles in daily
life, such as wood, plastic, metal and the human body, to
shield the direct path between the legitimate user and the
AP. Then, we test the performance of our system.
As shown in Figure 15, we can yield an average TP rate
of 93.65% and FP rate lower than 3.1% in the LoS scenarios.
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Figure 17: The performance with respect to the vary-
ing distances between the attacker and legitimate user
in dynamic environment.
However, if there are obstacles shielding the path between
them, the accuracy of legitimate user detection slightly de-
creases, especially for the metal medium. That is because the
metal, a conducting medium, has a shielding effect on the
radio propagation. However, we can still achieve an average
TP rate of 92% and FP rate lower than 5%, which is acceptable
and we can confirm that ShieldScatter is reliable even though
the channel is sheltered by the daily obstacles.
Number of backscatter tags. In our experiment, the
number of the backscatter tags used to deploy around the
AP and construct multi-path signatures is an important fac-
tor for the radio propagation. Thus, we then evaluate the
performance when using a different number of backscatter
tags attached around the AP.
As shown in Figure 16, we can observe that if we just attach
one or two backscatter tags on the AP, ShieldScatter can
achieve an average FP rate higher than 10%. It is because the
active attacker can easily calculate the distance and power
between the legitimate user and the AP. Then the attacker
can carefully select the transmitting power and locations for
attacking. However, if we deploy three tags, the attacker is
harder to keep the arrived power for each tag being similar
to the power from the legitimate user. Hence, we can achieve
an average TP rate as high as 93.7% and FP rate lower than 3%.
In addition, if we exploit too many tags (e.g., 4 tags), it leads
to strict constraints to the received signal, and accordingly
achieve a lower FP rate and lower TP rate. Therefore, three
backscatter tags are a appropriate choice in our system.
5.3 Dynamic Environment
People walking around. ShieldScatter considers another
practical environment for the daily smart home devices, that
is, the scenario where some people are walking around. As
shown in Figure 12, in order to emulate the dynamic environ-
ment, two volunteers are asked to walk around the devices,
approach the user, go across the channel and carry out the
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Figure 18: The performance when the legitimate user
is slightly moved.
daily activities. Then, we evaluate the performance with re-
spect to different distances between the legitimate user and
attacker.
As shown in Figure 17, compared with the results in static
environment, when the environment is dynamic, the TP and
FP rates of ShieldScatter have slight fluctuation caused by
environment noise. However, when we exploit the filter to
remove the noise caused by the dynamic effects, ShieldScat-
ter can still maintain an average TP rate higher than 91%,
which is acceptable for the smart home IoT devices. Besides,
ShieldScatetr achieves an average FP rate lower than 1.9%,
when the distance is larger than 20 cm. That is because the
channel fluctuation makes it more difficult for the attacker
to emulate the power for each tag. Thus, our system can
remain reliable even in the dynamic environment.
Slight movement of the legitimate user. ShieldScatter
takes into account the case that the smart home devices are
slightly moved. Specifically, as shown in Figure 12, the legit-
imate user is first placed at location A, and then it is moved
to a different place as the blue blocks. Then, we evaluate
the performance of our system with respect to the distance
between the location A and the user.
As shown in Figure 18, we can achieve an average FP rate
lower than 3% when the user is moved to different locations.
On the other hand, when the legitimate user is placed at loca-
tion A, we can achieve a TP rate of 93%. Then, if we move the
user within a short distance (e.g., within 30 cm), the TP rate
remains stable. When the user moves to a longer distance,
the TP rate would decrease. However, we can still achieve a
TP rate larger than 87% even though the movement distance
is 50 cm. Therefore, slight movements of the legitimate user
are allowed in our system.
5.4 Impact Factors for SVM
In this section, we evaluate the following two key impact
factors on our one-class SVM system.
Training size. In our experiment, ShieldScatter needs
to exploit a training set to train a one-class SVM classifier.
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Figure 19: The performance with respect to the vary-
ing number of data samples to train the model.
Then, based on well-trained classifier, we test the testing
profiles to detect the legitimate user and defend against the
suspicious signals. Thus, it is necessary to select appropriate
number of the training set to train and construct the classi-
fier for ShieldScatter. In particular, we train our model with
respect to different number of profiles ranging from 50 to
1,000 samples.
As described in Figure 19, when the data samples used to
train the one-class SVMmodel are less than 200, ShieldScatter
can achieve average TP rate lower than 90%. However, when
we adopt the training samples larger than 600, we can achieve
a relatively reliable TP rate of 93.6% and FP rate lower than 3%.
Consequently, we leverage 577 samples to train and construct
our profile.
The ratio of positive to negative samples. Based on
the priori knowledge about one-class SVM, the ratio of posi-
tive to negative samples that used to train the model is an
important factor. Thus, we evaluate the performance com-
bined with different ratio of between them. Additionally, a
noticeable constraint for one-class SVM model that the ratio
of positive to negative samples should be very large. In other
words, one-class SVM model generally makes use of large
number of positive and a few or even no negative samples to
train the model. Thus, we study the performance of Shield-
Scatter with respect to the low ratio of positive to negative
samples ranging from 0.05 to 0.5.
As presented in Figure 20, when the number of the nega-
tive samples is too small, for example, the ratio of positive to
negative samples is lower than 0.05, ShieldScatter achieves
an average TP rate lower than 90% and FP rate larger than
10%. This is because if the negative sample are too small,
the suspicious signals on the bound are circled in legitimate
user but the positive samples are moved out. Conversely, if
the number of the negative samples are too large, the model
is unable to distinguish the positive and negative samples,
which will lead to lower detection accuracy for the model.
Therefore, ShieldScatter selects the ratio of positive to nega-
tive samples as low as 0.154 for the model training.
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6 RELATEDWORK
Backscatter communications. Backscatter communica-
tion has been considered as a promising communication
mechanism in the future. Ambient backscatter originates
from the RFID systems that makes use of RFID readers to pro-
vide power and communicate with battery-free tags [23]. The
difference between them is that backscatter can harvest am-
bient RF signal and enable two RF-powered devices to com-
municate by scattering and creating the path on the ambient
signals [12]. Besides, in order to enable different RF-powered
devices to communicate with each other, WiFi backscatter,
FM backscatter and FS backscatter are proposed [8, 21, 30],
which makes backscatter communication become applicable
for current IoT devices. In our study, ShieldScatter employs
the backscatter tags as [12] to create significant multi-path
propagation signatures and construct unique profile for the
IoT device.
Physical-layer propagation signatures. Recent years,
fine-grained physical-layer propagation signatures [13, 25,
26, 29]have been successfully used to secure wireless sys-
tem. For example, SecureArray [27] secures WiFi by using
AoA information to construct sensitive signatures. Besides,
some researchers seek for other signatures, such as received
signal strength (RSS) for user authentication [1, 2]. Proxi-
mate [15] securely pairs two devices in proximity within
a half-wavelength distance by comparing their RSS varia-
tions. Wanda [17] employs two antennas to authenticate the
devices in proximity according to the large RSS variations be-
tween the two antennas. However, these studies need two or
more antennas to construct the signatures, which will be not
appropriate for the smart home IoT devices that contain only
one antenna. Different from the past works, ShieldScatter se-
cures the IoT devices without additional antennas and it can
still achieve high detecting accuracy with several low-cost
backscatter tags for assistance.
Wireless localization.Accurate localization can help de-
tect the signals and secure the IoT devices. SpotFi [9] can
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achieve high localization accuracy for the devices by com-
bining AoA signatures with time of flight (ToF). WiTag [10]
localizes the backscatter tags using commodity WiFi signals.
Other localization systems, such as RFID, are also explored to
localize the IoT devices [22, 24, 28]. PinIt [24] deploys large
number of RFID tags around the devices and then exploits
multipath to localize the target that has the similar multi-
path profiles. All these RFID-based methods need a dedicated
RFID reader to help communicate with the tags.
7 CONCLUSION
We present ShieldScatter, a lightweight system to secure
IoT devices pairing and data transmission by intentionally
creating multi-path signatures by using several low-cost
backscatter tags that are attached to an AP or IoT device.
ShieldScatter secures IoT devices without using an expensive
antenna array or hardware modification to existing devices.
We have evaluated the performance of ShieldScatter in both
static and dynamic environments. Our results show that even
the attacker is located only 15 cm away from the legitimate
device, ShieldScatter with merely three backscatter tags can
mitigate 97% of spoofing attack attempts while at the same
time triggering false alarms on just 7% of legitimate traffic.
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